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ABSTRACT 
 
CAROLINE MÜRER ROHDE-MOE: The Eurozone: Effects on Spain After the 
Implementation of the Euro 
 
(Under the direction of Joshua Hendrickson) 
 
   This thesis examines the current situation in the Eurozone and how the entry 
into the currency union has affected the member countries. I have especially focused 
on the consequences the implementation of the euro has had on Spain because of the 
deeper recession that this country has experienced compared to many of the other 
Eurozone countries. I wanted to figure out what has caused some nations to struggle 
at a different level than others. By comparing Spain to countries such as Germany, 
United Kingdom, and France I have tried to look into how much of the domestic 
problems seen in the Eurozone are the result of the common monetary 
policy and how much is due to country-specific issues. 
   The paper briefly describes currency unions where the relatively short-lived 
Eurozone currency union is compared to the American currency union using the 
dollar. Furthermore, the Eurozone financial crisis of 2008 is discussed and how the 
period right after the crisis has been crucial for the countries that today are finding 
themselves encountering economic difficulties. The data that has been gathered for 
this paper comes from examining previous journals and researching various Internet 
sources. 
   The findings illustrate that the problems that many of the nations in the 
Eurozone have encountered are a mix of the imposed monetary policy that the 
countries were obligated to follow when entering the currency union, and country-
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specific issues. To explore these indicators further, statistical data such as the 
unemployment rate, debt to GDP ratio, and inflation rates were examined. Spain’s 
unemployment rate is currently extremely high, and I found that it has diverged from 
many of the other countries in the Eurozone since the financial crisis of 2008. This 
problem has risen from for example the country’s employment protection legislation, 
strong protection of permanent workers, and high share of temporary workers. My 
findings for Spain illustrate that the problem has been a mix between the common 
Eurozone monetary policy and Spain’s employment protection legislation policy. 
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Introduction 
 
A unique attempt of European economic integration was done in 1999 with the 
introduction of the common currency for the Eurozone countries. I am researching 
how the different member nations have reacted to this membership. In my work, I 
especially focus on the consequences this change has had on the Spanish economy, 
which has been struggling for various reasons since the implementation of the euro. In 
this research I will try to answer whether it could be that this deeper recession Spain 
has experienced is due to structural problems unique to Spain, or if it is due to the 
membership of Spain in the European Union, which would indicate a suboptimal 
policy. By looking at Spain in particular, I try to determine the extent to which the 
problems European countries have experienced are the result of a common monetary 
policy and how much is the result of country-specific characteristics. In the paper I 
have done a detailed analysis of the Spanish labor market and compared it to other 
member nations in the Eurozone to see if it was a good or bad decision for Spain to 
join the common currency union.
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Chapter 1 
 
Currency Unions 
 
A. What are Currency Unions? 
 
   A currency union consists of a group of countries with the same currency that 
also shares a common monetary policy. Currency unions are often used as a way to 
achieve international economic integration. It is common for countries within a 
currency union to share geographical borders, and hence the member nations are often 
close trading partners. A currency union also has a common central bank. There has 
been a lot of research looking at the advantages and disadvantages of currency unions. 
Different research has found benefits and costs of membership in a currency union. 
For example, Hugh Rockoff (2000) found in his research that one benefit of a 
currency union is that it makes it easy to travel to another part of the union without 
having to convert money. This aspect makes it especially easy for tourists and 
producers to travel and do business amongst the different member countries without 
complications of various currencies. Also, one can easily compare prices for goods 
and services, and interregional investments can be made without the risk of currency 
fluctuations. Another advantage of being a member of a currency union is that 
transaction costs get reduced due to the fact that the people travelling within the 
currency union do not have to exchange currency and hence avoid paying commission 
to financial intermediaries. A common currency between a group of countries also 
creates a degree of certainty for firms because it is easier for them to predict the cost 
of materials they use in production that are imported from other countries. This aspect
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makes it easier for firms to plan for the future because they can find a good estimate 
of how much their exports will cost, hence, allowing them to be more certain about 
predictions for future budgets. This tendency will make firms more likely to invest 
and create more jobs. 
However, researchers have also argued that there are many costs of joining a 
monetary union. The biggest disadvantage is that a country that enters a monetary 
union loses their sovereignty over monetary policy and is not able to control their 
economy in the same way they would have been able to do if they were independent. 
Another problem that countries have encountered when establishing a currency union 
is that convergence between economies can be difficult due to the uniqueness of every 
country’s economy. When there are big differences between the countries it can be 
seen as unproductive to have the same monetary policy because policies that will 
benefit one country might be disastrous for another. These differences are an aspect 
that I will examine about the Eurozone and how it has affected the different member 
countries, especially Spain. The countries that joined the currency union in Europe 
had vastly different economies before the entry and to share a common monetary 
policy has led to difficulties for certain member countries. This issue is because of the 
possibility that monetary policy for the Eurozone as a whole is different from the 
desired policy of one particular member country. One reason for this disadvantage is 
that member countries might be subject to asymmetric shocks. A currency union is 
subject to an asymmetric shock if the demand or supply side of one or more of the 
member countries is affected differently than any of the other member countries when 
a shock in the economy occurs. For example, if the German government decides to 
make changes to the country’s fiscal policy by increasing government expenditures, it 
will result in a positive aggregate demand shock for Germany. However, if the 
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government in France, at the same time, decides to adjust their fiscal policy by doing 
the opposite and lower expenditures in the country, then France will experience a 
negative aggregate demand shock. If this were the case, then these two different 
countries would be better off with separate currencies, and floating or at least 
adjustable rates between them (Rockoff, 2000). When a currency union is 
experiencing asymmetric shocks between their member countries it is challenging for 
the central bank of the monetary union to conduct a monetary policy that is beneficial 
for each member of the union. The country that is most affected by an asymmetric 
shock would benefit from having a lower interest rate compared to the other 
countries. Therefore, there are obvious costs associated with joining a currency union. 
Nonetheless, there are examples of countries and regions that have benefitted from 
entering into currency unions, the most obvious of which is the United States. 
One of the most famous and recent examples of a currency union is the attempt of 
unifying the currencies of the many nations in Europe. The Eurozone was formed 
January 1st, 1999 when eleven countries in Europe adopted the common currency. 
The introduction of the euro in 1999 was a major step towards a closer European 
integration. The countries that joined the Eurozone gave up their national currencies 
to use the euro as their medium of exchange. By January 21st, 2002 all the national 
currencies of the member nations ceased to circulate and were replaced by the euro. 
The Eurozone currency union is in many ways an unparalleled experiment in 
monetary unification and a milestone in European integration. Today, the Eurozone, 
which currently consists of 18 countries, has been going for 15 years and more than 
333 million EU citizens use the euro as their currency. 
   Since the introduction of the euro some things have changed in the Eurozone. 
For example, Francesco Paolo Mongelli (2002) argues that countries sharing the same 
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currency trade three times as much as they would with different currencies and being 
a member of a currency union more than triples trade among partner countries. 
Therefore Eurozone countries are becoming more specialized by focusing on the 
activities in which they are comparatively stronger. A relevant question is which 
direction causation runs and whether countries are in a currency union because they 
rely on trading with other countries, or start trading more because they form a 
currency union. There is now also more emphasis on the benefits for a larger group of 
countries scoring highly under most Optimal Currency Area properties. In his work, 
Mogelli (2002) argues that 10-15 years ago it was not believed that the Eurozone 
would have as many member as it does today. The euro has already developed into a 
major currency and in some ways it is challenging the U.S. dollar as the global 
reserve currency. In their research, Lars Jonung and Eoin Drea argue that the euro is 
one of the most exciting experiments in monetary history due to the fact that never 
before have some of the world’s largest economies surrendered their national 
currencies and national monetary sovereignty in favor of a common currency and a 
common central bank (Jonung and Drea, 2010). 
 
B. The Theory of Optimal Currency Areas 
As previously mentioned, the most significant characteristic of currency 
unions is that the member nations have surrendered their own currency and now share 
a common currency. The Theory of Optimal Currency Areas centers on the issue of 
whether or not a geographic region should share a currency in order to maximize 
economic efficiency, and grew out of the debate over fixed versus flexible exchange 
rates. Mongelli (2002) defines an optimal currency area as “the optimal geographic 
domain of a single currency, or of several currencies, whose exchange rates are 
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irrevocably pegged and might be unified.” Therefore, an optimal currency area is a 
geographical region in which it would maximize economic efficiency to have the 
entire region share a common currency. Mongelli (2002) also argues that the 
European experience with economic and monetary union is the most important 
example of recently established currency unions and the one to which the Theory of 
Optimal Currency Areas has been most frequently applied. This signals how much the 
Eurozone countries can benefit from their currency union if they manage to lead it in 
the right direction. The monetary union in the Eurozone is interesting because 
individual countries of Europe do not each form an optimal currency area, but 
together as a whole Europe is an example of a prospect that can be a successful 
monetary union. 
To become a strong currency union like the U.S. is a long and difficult 
process. Throughout history, it is evident that to become a successful currency union 
there are central phases that an area has to go through. In his research, Mongelli 
(2002) recognizes four phases of the optimum currency area: pioneering phase, 
reconciliation phase, reassessment phase, and empirical phase. Rockoff (2000) 
argues that optimal currency area theorists have found several factors that identify an 
area as a candidate for its own currency, including that it must be a large area that is 
specialized in the production of certain goods. If the member nations of the currency 
union have similar economies with related production then it will be easier for the 
central bank to conduct a monetary policy that will be beneficial for all countries. 
This aspect will protect the currency union from large asymmetric shocks, which 
economies are subject to over the course of the business cycle. Other factors that are 
important in order for countries to be suitable to enter into a currency union together 
are labor mobility and capital mobility. High labor mobility is important because it 
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enables workers to work in other countries within the currency union and can 
therefore result in more skilled workers for the correct jobs, hence an increase in 
productivity. However, labor mobility can also result in a higher unemployment rate 
and lower wages so it is important for the currency union to consist of economies 
where labor mobility can be exploited. Capital mobility is significant for a currency 
union because it is important for the member countries to be able to easily transfer 
capital across boarders without incurring high transaction costs in the process. Also, 
fiscal transfers between the candidate region and other regions should be limited 
because this will keep as much capital as possible running through the currency union 
and therefore become a stronger area (Rockoff, 2000).  
In his research, Marjan Petreski (2007) lists other factors that are detrimental 
elements to whether an area is optimal for a currency union or not. He argues that 
when a shock in the economy occurs, it is important for the currency union to have 
price and wage flexibility that will allow the corrective adjustments that have to be 
made help all of the member countries. With this flexibility, the currency union will 
avoid creating a high unemployment rate in one country and inflation in the other. In 
the same paper, Petreski (2007) also argues that when inflation rates of the countries 
in a currency union converge, the terms of trade will do the same. Another important 
aspect of a currency union that Petreski (2007) discuss is that it should be a unified 
financial market, which will prevent the need for an exchange rate adjustment. He 
expands on this issue with relating it to the significance of economic openness. The 
argument is that the higher the openness, the faster the international prices transmit on 
the domestic monetary scene. The last and most crucial element that Petreski (2007) 
argues has to be present in a currency union in order for it to have the properties of an 
optimal area is political integration. Political integration will lead to a higher chance 
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of commitment to joint economic policies, a common fiscal policy, and similarity in 
institutions among the member countries. A valid question is if Europe can fulfill 
these requirements. As one can see with the experience of the U.S. it takes a long time 
to successfully complete the process of establishing a currency union and over time it 
will be interesting to see if the euro will manage to become as powerful as the dollar. 
 
C. Government Debt and Common Currencies 
i. Why is this different for Countries in Currency Unions Relative to those 
with Sovereign Countries? 
While they are both large currency unions, the Eurozone is different than the 
United States. The Eurozone is only a currency union due to the shared currency and 
the common bank that is in charge of monetary policy, the European Central Bank. 
The United States is one country consisting of 50 states that share the same political 
system as well as the same economic system. Many researchers have compared the 
currency unions of the United States and Europe. Mongelli (2002) argues that the 
biggest difference between the two powerful currencies is that the single European 
currency is shared by a group of sovereign countries that do not form a single state. 
This highlights one issue that the Eurozone has encountered; the fact that they are not 
under the same political systems like what American citizens are in the U.S. Lars 
Jonung and Eoin Drea (2010) argue that the unification of the countries in the 
Eurozone was an inherently political process and that there is an inseparability of 
politics and economics in the European monetary unification. For example, before the 
Eurozone, researchers were concerned with how other big nations in Europe would 
handle forming a continental government in which Germany has the largest 
population and the strongest economy. Some researchers believed that a political 
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union needed to precede a monetary union and that the sustainability of the single 
currency would depend on the political will to cooperate of the EU member countries 
(Jonung and Drea, 2010). Therefore, the Eurozone currency union meets greater 
challenges than what the U.S. did in the development of a shared currency, due to the 
fact that in the Eurozone each country has their own set of rules and regulations. 
Therefore, whenever a decision is to be made concerning the monetary union it will 
have to go through many different governments with different incentives, hence it can 
be time-consuming and difficult to get changes implemented. On the other hand, there 
are a lot of things that the Eurozone countries can learn from the U.S. currency union 
and their experience of becoming the largest reserve in the world. 
ii. Lessons from the U.S. Experience 
Throughout history there are a few examples of countries or states trying to go 
together to form a currency union. As noted above, the most successful example is the 
United States. Hugh Rockoff (2000) argues that, 
The U.S. is often taken to be the exemplar of the benefits of a monetary union. 
Since 1788 Americans have been able to buy and sell goods, travel and invest 
within a vast area without ever having to be concerned about changes in 
exchange rates. They have had problems, like shocks. But political 
considerations have ruled out separate currencies in the United States. 
It is clear that to get to the point where the United States’ monetary union is today has 
required a long process with a lot of trouble. For example, throughout the first 150 
years of the U.S. monetary union, there were several disputes within the country. 
Many of them were regional disputes, for example what was considered a good 
monetary policy from the point of view of one region was sometimes bad policy from 
the point of view of another (Rockoff, 2000). The experience of the United States is 
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cited as evidence that in fact the benefits of a monetary union greatly outweigh the 
costs. After all, their monetary union has survived since 1788. The problem is that due 
to this long process and the several severe conflicts the U.S. had to go through in 
order to get to the point where they are today, research has found that it is at best 
weak evidence that the net effects of the shared currency in the United States have 
been positive (Rockoff, 2000). It can also be said that it took a long time for the U.S. 
to develop their currency to be as stable as it is today. For example, Rockoff (2000) 
argues that a reasonable minimum time that the U.S. used to establish the position of 
the dollar might be one hundred and fifty years. Therefore, it will be a gradual process 
for the European monetary union to establish a strong currency for all the member 
countries. 
   However, some research suggests that the Eurozone would be better off with 
individual currencies like they had in the past. Jonung and Drea (2010) state that 
research has questioned the fiscal federalism under the lessons from the U.S. 
experience and several have questioned whether the Eurozone would be better off 
sharing a common monetary standard instead of a common currency. They argued 
that a common monetary standard is preferable to a common currency because it 
respects the fiscal need to keep national central banks and national currencies in place 
in highly indebted European countries. Therefore, it is clear that many researchers are 
against the shared currency in Europe and share the point of view that a monetary 
union is not the preferred option for the Eurozone. 
Thomas J. Sargent (2012) argues that another lesson that the Eurozone can learn from 
the U.S. experience is:  
The ability to borrow today depends on expectations about future revenues 
(prospective debt holders rationally anticipate that the government will be 
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constrained in its ability to raise enough revenues to service the debt), Free-
rider problems exist for subordinate governments vis-à-vis a central 
government (states in the U.S. or nations in the EU cannot be relied on 
voluntarily to provide to the central government to pay for public goods, each 
state has an incentive to refuse), Good reputations can be costly to acquire 
(governments therefore have incentives to earn reputations that they will pay 
off their debts in the future), It can help to sustain distinct reputations with 
different parties, Confused monetary-fiscal coordination creates uncertainties. 
Many researchers have been concerned with the implications for the global position 
of the dollar as a result of the introduction of a common European currency. It has 
been argued that there is a possibility that the Americans will feel threatened by the 
Eurozone currency union. However, in many ways, the U.S. is embracing the 
cooperation of the European countries. The Americans have also said that it is 
believed that the euro would only have an impact on the dollar as the predominant 
means of exchange in international financial transactions in the long run and it would 
only occur gradually in a manner that would be easily coped with. Therefore, the 
American view on the euro was that it would not present a challenge for the dollar in 
the “foreseeable” future. After two years of the euro, in 2001, it was noticed only a 
small change in the role of the dollar as the pegged exchange rate for third world 
countries or as the globally preferred reserve currency (Jonung and Drea, 2010). 
Researchers have also argued that the rise of the euro as an international currency and 
competitor for the dollar would only be achieved gradually, and that the position of 
the dollar as the lending international currency depended primarily upon the ability of 
the U.S. to avoid financial crises and to maintain strong economic performance. Most 
research agrees that the establishment of the euro created many new benefits for U.S. 
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firms in trade and finance. On the other hand, it is found that the introduction of the 
euro will cause a significant drop in the international holdings of dollars. However, 
the Americans have also identified the opportunity of a larger market and the removal 
of obstacles to trade freely within the European Union’s borders as the future benefits 
of European monetary union to U.S. businesses. The official position of the U.S. 
government was that the euro was a sign of progress made by the European Union 
(Jonung and Drea, 2010). It has been commented that the euro and the dollar will 
always be in a struggle for dominance, and the severe decline in the value of the euro 
compared to the dollar in the period between 1999 and 2001 triggered a strong debate 
about the euro against the dollar. Some people argued that since the euro would create 
an integrated currency area greater than the U.S., the euro would quickly rival and 
even surpass the dollar as the international reserve currency. It was forecasted that by 
2010 the world foreign exchange reserves will consist of 1.2 trillion in dollar, 1.2 
trillion in euros, and 0.8 trillion in other currencies. Today, however, the dollar 
remains the leading reserve currency (Jonung and Drea, 2010). 	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Chapter 2 
 
The Eurozone Crisis 
 
A. Description of the Crisis 
The European System of Central Banks (ESCB) is comprised of the European 
Central Bank (ECB) and the national banks of all EU member countries, whether they 
use the euro or not. In countries that use the euro, the national central banks no longer 
issue currency. Much of the process of designing the ESCB was based upon 
comparisons with the Federal Reserve System. There are a number of similarities 
between the two biggest monetary unions in the world. For example, the European 
Central Bank and the Federal Reserve both consists of different regions or countries. 
The ECB currently has 18 countries within itself and the Federal Reserve is composed 
of 12 districts. Each bank is an independent institution with a decentralized structure. 
However, these two central banks are characterized by significant differences in many 
aspects. The biggest differences between the European and the U.S. central banking 
systems are their policy mandates, the concentration of power and the decision-
making structures (Jonung and Drea, 2010).  
The Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank have different objectives 
and different methods of achieving these objectives. For example, the primary 
objective of the ECB is to maintain price stability within the Eurozone, which they are 
doing by trying to keep inflation low and preventing deflation. Jonung and Drea 
(2010) argue that the ECB’s clear policy mandate would aid its long-term credibility, 
but that the broad diffusion of power might prevent them from resolving future 
conflicts between national interests. On the other hand, the Federal Reserve has
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chosen several objectives to pursue such as having a safe, flexible and stable 
monetary and financial system (The Federal Reserve System, 1984, 1).  
Another issue that has affected the accountability of the ECB compared to the Federal 
Reserve is that the Federal Reserve has a very defined process of operating and 
everything is going on in between the same borders with the same politics and 
decision-making processes. The governors of the Federal Reserve are nominated by 
the President and approved by the Senate. Also, the Federal Reserve publishes all the 
steps that they take in monetary policy in monthly reports to the Senate, which are 
available to the public. In that way it is easier for U.S. citizens to know what is going 
on and by making it available to the public, it is evident that they will fit the political 
interests of the greatest part of the people. 
   However, as described earlier, it took the United States a long time to develop 
their currency union into today’s strong dollar. The development of the euro in the 
Eurozone has already been a long process. In their research, Lars Jonung and Eoin 
Drea (2010) argue that the work of all the nations that wanted to be a part of the 
Eurozone currency union began in June 1988 when the European Council met in 
Hanover, Germany, and set up the Committee for the Study of Economic and 
Monetary Union which included all the European Council central bank governors. 
This meeting resulted in The Delors Report, named after Jacques Delors, then 
president of the European Community. The objective for this process was that they 
would create a monetary union in Europe with a possible replacement of national 
currencies with a single currency.  
The Delors Report included a three-stage program in the development of the 
Eurozone currency union that had the ultimate goal of turning Europe into a true 
distinct market. The period between 1989 and 2002 has often been divided into two 
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phases. The first phase begins with the publication of the Delors Report. In 1992, The 
Maastricht Treaty was signed. In this treaty, the European Council governors had 
outlined “convergence criteria” for the Eurozone’s transition to become a currency 
union. The conditions were based on the rate of inflation, long-term interest rates, and 
membership of at least two years in the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European 
Monetary System before entry into the monetary union. The Maastricht Treaty also 
obtained clear limits for the government budget to deficit to GDP and the ratio of 
government debt to GDP, which each member country had to stay below. The 
margins for the Exchange Rate Mechanism were 2.25 percent above or below a 
central rate for most member currencies (Jonung and Drea, 2010).  
At this point, there was much debate as to how to implement the euro. During 
the modifications of The Maastricht Treaty the strategy discussed that the majority 
believed would be most successful implementation of the euro was to allow EU 
countries into the monetary union at different times. This idea of a multi-speed 
transition to EMU was the most popular proposal due to the fact that through this kind 
of transition to a currency union a small group of countries would first form the 
fundament of the monetary union, with the other countries joining in over time. 
Jonung and Drea (2010) concluded that a multispeed approach was to be expected, 
albeit with slightly differing combinations of countries.  
In the Maastricht Treaty it was suggested a set of modifications to ensure that 
the advantages of joining the currency union would outweigh the disadvantages. The 
Madrid Summit of December 1995 concluded the first phase. This event was where 
the European Council decided the final timetable for the launching of the euro, which 
set the starting date of January 1999 for the euro and for irrevocably fixing the 
exchange rates of the currencies of the initial member states seeking to introduce the 
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euro. In The Madrid Summit they also decided to call the currency “euro” replacing 
the name European Currency Unit (ECU). In May 1998, they selected the countries 
that would adopt the euro in January 1999.  
The second phase began right after The Madrid Summit and lasted up until 
January 2002, when euro notes and coins entered circulation, replacing each of the 
independent currencies in the Eurozone countries. This time was chosen for the 
launching of the currency union because there existed an opportunity in Europe to 
build a currency union among many countries. One of the reasons was due to the fact 
that many nations felt a need for monetary unification of Europe because of the 
region’s lack of mobility at the time as well as the need to improve the relationships 
between countries. Another cause to why it at this point was a unique opportunity to 
move towards a single currency in Europe was because of the end of the Soviet 
Union, German unification, and growing nominal exchange rate stability in Western 
Europe. 
However, the implementation of the Eurozone currency union has not always 
been a successful integration and many countries are struggling today. When the euro 
was initiated, the member countries were imposed with a single currency and fixed 
exchange rates. This change imposed problems for some of the member countries 
because they now had to follow the monetary policy set by the European Central 
Bank and could not adjust it for their needs like they could when the countries had 
independent monetary policies. This issue increased the amount of cyclical 
unemployment among the countries in the Eurozone. One problem that many have 
discussed with the euro is that the monetary policy objective only takes into account 
price stability and it does not take into account employment, production or growth. As 
earlier described, since the Eurozone countries all have different political systems, it 
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is hard to implement changes in monetary policies. Thomas J. Sargent (2012: page 3) 
argues that the fiscal institutions in the Eurozone today are similar to those in the U.S. 
under the Articles of Confederation, “the power to tax lies with the member states. 
Unanimous consent by member states is required for many important EU-wide fiscal 
actions.” 
As previously mentioned, another potential problem that can result in conflicts 
between the countries in the Eurozone is the lack of political integration in the area. 
There is a possible conflict with the fact that there will be an inevitable contest for 
leadership between the most powerful nations in the Eurozone, such as Germany and 
France, which is likely to aggravate tensions within the currency union. Therefore it is 
argued that the long run sustainability of the European Monetary Union will depend 
on its contribution to long-term political security rather than on any economic success 
(Jonung and Drea, 2010). There have been identified three primary factors behind the 
desire of member states to join the Eurozone currency union. These includes: the fear 
of being left out of a central European Union institution, the fear of losing the support 
of the pan-European business community, and the fear of the economic consequences 
of losing the benefit of many years of hard work to get into Europe’s monetary club. 
It is believed that economic success of the euro would be a potential driver of political 
integration in the future (Jonung and Drea, 2010). 
As stated above, the U.S. economy has often been used as a benchmark of a 
successfully functioning monetary union to compare to how the Eurozone currency 
union has progressed. This aspect has especially been the case in the debate of 
comparing the development of the Eurozone’s currency union with the Theory of 
Optimal Currency Areas that they used in the integration of the dollar in the U.S. 
However, Lars Jonung and Eoin Drea (2010) argue that the Eurozone can be labeled 
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as a suboptimal currency area. In their article they describe that the Eurozone was 
“much less equipped” than the U.S. monetary union to deal with potential 
interregional or wider asymmetric shocks. They concluded that this mirrored the 
initial U.S. consensus that the Eurozone was a suboptimal currency area. Also, 
Jonung and Drea (2010) argued that a major asymmetrical shock would cause the 
Eurozone to dissolve. Another argument is that the optimum currency area criteria 
were endogenous. Which implies that once a country joins a currency union, its 
economy will adjust to the new environment. 
The financial crisis of 2008 originated in the American housing market and 
developed into a worldwide economic downturn. In his work, Paolo Manasse (2013) 
provides a figure that compares the U.S. GDP with the Eurozone GDP from 2006 to 
2013. 
Figure 1. Comparison of the U.S. GDP and the Eurozone GDP 2006-2013 
 
Source: Manasse (2013) 
Figure 1 shows that the global economic crisis began earlier in the U.S. (2007), than 
in the Eurozone (2008). Therefore, one can say that the crisis originated in the U.S. 
and later spread to the Eurozone. Also, one can see from the figure that the fall in 
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output had a larger impact on the Eurozone. Manasse describes this by “The US 
economy started recovering from 2009, while in the Eurozone recovery has been 
short-lived, and flattens out in 2010” (Manasse, 2013). One can see that this financial 
setback had more severe consequences for the Eurozone than the U.S. This problem 
has forced certain members of the Eurozone (countries located in the south as well as 
Ireland especially) to continuously finance budget deficits due to increasing national 
debt. Since the beginning of the crisis, there have been multiple asymmetric shocks to 
the economy and the Eurozone still lacks ways of dealing with them. In the article 
“Eurozone crisis explained” the situation in Europe is described as,  
There was a big build-up of debts in Spain and Italy before 2008, but it had 
nothing to do with governments. Instead it was the private sector, companies 
and mortgage borrowers, who were taking out loans. Interest rates had fallen 
to unprecedented lows in southern European countries when they joined the 
Euro. And that encouraged a debt-fuelled boom (BBC News, 2012). 
 
Figure 2. Total Debt as a Percentage of Annual Economic Output for Eurozone 
Countries  
 
Source: "Eurozone Crisis Explained." BBC News 19 June 2012: n. pag. Print 
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Figure 2, from the same article, displays that the debt of Eurozone countries grew by 
very high percentages between 2000 and 2010. As one can see from the figure, 
private debt has been the larger issue. However, the Eurozone has been trying 
different methods to help prevent further losses for the affected countries. For 
example, in 2010 they created a temporary crisis fund called the European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF). The main concern that the EFSF was going to address and 
try to improve was the lack of financial stability for some of the countries in the 
Eurozone. To improve this issue, the EFSF was going to provide financial assistance 
to Eurozone member countries within the framework of a macro-economic 
adjustment program (About EFSF). The EFSF provided cheap loans to the countries 
that were most affected by the debt crisis. The countries that received this help 
committed themselves to implement powerful changes to the public finances. Thus 
far, several countries have used this help. In May 2010, Greece received their first 
emergency loan of 110 billion euros from the EFSF, the International Monetary Fund 
and the European Central Bank. In November 2010, Ireland received a crisis loan of 
85 billion euros and in May 2011 Portugal received a loan of 78 billion euros. In 
2012, Spain and Cyprus requested emergency loans for their country’s banks. 
i. Detailed Analysis of the Eurozone Financial Crisis 
In his speech at the Festival of Economics in Trento, Italy, at June 2nd, 2012, 
George Soros explained some of the conflicts that the Eurozone has encountered and 
the crisis in more detail. Before the countries entered into the Eurozone and adopted 
the euro as their currency, the less economically strong countries in Europe, such as 
Portugal, Ireland, Spain, and Greece, had to pay a larger amount to be able to borrow 
money from the bigger countries such as Germany, France, and United Kingdom. 
When the currency union was formed, all the member nations got the advantage of 
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being able to borrow at the same rate in between all countries in the union. In his 
speech, Soros (2012) argues: 
When the euro was introduced the regulators allowed banks to buy unlimited 
amounts of government bonds without setting aside any equity capital; and the 
central bank accepted all government bonds at its discount window on equal 
terms. Commercial banks found it advantageous to accumulate the bonds of 
the weaker euro members in order to earn a few extra basis points. That is 
what caused interest rates to converge which in turn caused competitiveness to 
diverge. 
In a way this made Eurozone countries, especially the ones with struggling 
economies, believe that bonds for all Eurozone countries are identical; whether they 
are sold by Ireland, Spain or Germany they are all the same. Therefore there were 
tendencies that banks rushed to lend money to the weaker Eurozone countries, hence 
their borrowing costs plummeted (Goldstein, 2012). Up until 2008 it looked like this 
prediction was true. During this time period, borrowing costs were almost identical 
for all of the countries in the Eurozone (See Figure 3). However, in 2008 this 
changed. During the nine years when it looked like all the Eurozone countries were 
benefitting from the common currency union, this indicator was wrong because the 
countries were actually diverging. In his speech, Soros (2012) argued that, 
Germany, struggling with the burdens of reunification, undertook structural 
reforms and became more competitive. Other countries enjoyed housing and 
consumption booms on the back of cheap credit, making them less 
competitive. 
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This point shows that the sovereign economies of the member countries in the 
Eurozone had extremely different development before and after the implementation of 
the euro and this has led to the large gap in the different countries’ reactions today. 
 
Figure 3. Interest Rates on 10-year Government Bonds for Eurozone Countries 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream 
As Figure 3 shows, one can clearly see the divergence of the interest rates on 10-year 
government bonds of these different Eurozone countries. This graph shows the 
reaction to that all these countries are, in fact, different countries with very different 
economies, and therefore not all Eurozone government bonds are identical. In his 
speech, Soros (2012) argued that, 
It took some time for the financial markets to discover that government bonds, 
which had been considered riskless, are subject to speculative attack and may 
actually default; but when they did, risk premiums rose dramatically. This 
rendered commercial banks whose balance sheets were loaded with those 
bonds potentially insolvent. And that constituted the two main components of 
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the problem confronting us today: a sovereign debt crisis and a banking crisis, 
which are closely interlinked. 
Therefore, the core of the European financial crisis is the two related problems with 
rising borrowing costs for the weaker countries in the Eurozone, and the banks that 
had already loaned money to these countries were now going to start struggling. As 
mentioned previously, certain nations were affected worse than others, and the next 
section describes this point. 
 
B. This Disparate Experience of Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Greece 
Data from Eurostat show that the current unemployment rate in the European 
Union is 10.7% (Seghi and Burn-Muldoch, 2013), which means that a large part of 
the people that wants to work are currently unable to find work. Compared to the 
other Eurozone countries, the unemployment rate is extremely high in Ireland, 
Portugal, Spain and Greece. With Spain and Greece being the countries with the 
highest unemployment rate: they both currently have an unemployment rate above 
26%. Figure 4 on the next page shows that Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Greece are 
the four countries in the Eurozone with the highest and fastest rising unemployment 
rates. If this trend continues, there is only a matter of time until other countries, such 
as Germany, who has a relatively stable unemployment rate now, will be dragged 
down together with the countries that are struggling. 
 Increasing unemployment rates are a big problem that the Eurozone members 
have encountered and one can now see how important it is for the nations with weaker 
economies that have adopted the euro to be quick to adapt to changes and respond to 
the euro crisis for their future welfare. Differences between countries such as Spain, 
Greece, Ireland, and Portugal compared to countries such as Germany and France is 
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Figure 4. Eurozone Unemployment Rates 1990-2011 
 
Source: Shedlock 
that the first group of countries does not have the same financial resources to protect 
themselves and their own interests in difficult financial times. Hence, as figure 4 
shows, weaker countries such as Spain, Greece, and Ireland have continued to diverge 
from more powerful nations such as Germany and France. The same figure 
demonstrates that it is over the period since around 2007 that the divergence in the 
unemployment rates has become very clear and this trend has become more and more 
extreme. 
   An interesting measure to look at is the debt to GDP ratios of the nations in the 
Eurozone in order to get an idea of the development the different countries have had 
under the currency union. The debt to GDP ratio provides an indication of the ability 
for a country to pay back its future debt. It is a good way to compare the different 
experiences that the member countries have had with the implementation of the 
common currency. In his research Robin Emmott (2013) argues,  
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A divide now exists between France and Germany on the one hand, where 
debt fell slightly in the third quarter from the second, and the economies of 
Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy, whose debt-to-GDP ratio rose in the 
July-September period. In Ireland, there was a burst real estate bubble, which 
forced the country into an international bailout, reached 117 per cent of 
economic output in the quarter, while the number was 127 per cent in Italy. 
Spain saw its burden tick up to 77 per cent of GDP, and the Commission sees 
it reaching 97 per cent in 2014. Greece’s debt rose to 153 per cent of GDP in 
the quarter and will reach 189 percent in 2014, although a deal struck by euro 
zone finance ministers and the International Monetary Fund in November aims 
to take it down to 124 per cent by 2020. Rising debt is particularly worrying 
for Italy and Spain, the euro zone’s fourth- and fifth-largest economies, which 
are in recession and need growth to cut debt and unemployment. 
Due to the fact that the economies of Spain, Ireland, Greece, and Portugal have 
struggled a lot after the economic crisis in 2008, it is interesting to look more in detail 
on their debt to GDP ratio. Table 1 provides the debt to GDP ratios for some of the 
Eurozone countries taken from Eurostat data. 
Table 1. Government Debt as a Percentage of GDP Eurozone Countries 2012 
and 2013 
  Government Debt as % of GDP 
  2012Q1 2012Q4 2013Q1 
Spain 73 84,2 88,2 
Ireland 106,8 117,4 125,1 
Greece 136,5 156,9 160,5 
Portugal 112,3 123,8 127,2 
Germany 81,1 81,9 81,2 
France 88,9 90,2 91,9 
United Kingdom 85,1 88,8 88,2 
Source: Eurostat 
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The values in Table 1 demonstrates that the debt to GDP ratios of Ireland, Greece, 
Portugal, and Spain have all been rising significantly over the period measured, while 
the debt to GDP ratios of Germany, France, and United Kingdom have remained more 
stable. In the first quarter of 2013, Ireland’s debt to GDP ratio was 125.1%, for 
Greece it was 160.5%, and for Portugal it was 127.2%. These values are extremely 
high, suggesting that these countries are struggling with repaying their debt. Spain’s 
debt to GDP ratio in the first quarter of 2013 was 88.2%, which is not as high as the 
other three countries just discussed. However, looking at the evident upward trend in 
the values of this measure that Spain has experienced, this increasing level of debt has 
the potential to develop into a problem for the country. Figure 5 below displays how 
the curve for the debt to GDP ratios for Portugal, Greece, Ireland, and Spain are 
steeper than the curves for Germany, France, and United Kingdom. It is this growing 
trend that is alarming for these four countries. 
 
Figure 5. Debt to GDP Ratio for Eurozone Countries 2012Q1-2013Q1 
 
Source: Eurostat 
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Figure 6 below compares the debt to GDP ratio for some of the Eurozone countries. 
The high values of Greece, Ireland and Portugal clearly stand out here. Spain lies a 
little under the other nations on this graph, but one has to consider the fact that after 
2011 the nation’s debt to GDP ratio has increased significantly. What is interesting to 
see here is the difference from year to year between the distinct countries and again 
one can see that Ireland, Greece, Portugal, and Spain are the countries with the 
highest increase from year to year. 
 
Figure 6. Debt to GDP Ratio for Selected European Countries 
	  	  
Source: Data from Eurostat 
Figure 7 on the following page demonstrates the estimates for the 2013 debt to GDP 
ratio for many of the same Eurozone countries as well as other big countries in the 
rest of the world. As one can see, many of the same Eurozone countries that have 
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been discussed previously are ranked high when comparing their debt to GDP ratios 
with other countries in the world as well. 
 
Figure 7. Estimate of the 2013 Debt to GDP Ratio for Selected Countries in the 
World  
 
Source: Wang, Data taken from OECD database 
Figure 8 on the next page also displays data over a longer time period where one can 
see the development of the debt to GDP ratio of these different Eurozone member 
nations. These four nations are what I am going to compare in the rest of this thesis in 
order to figure out what has caused this deeper recession that Spain has experienced 
compared to France, Germany, and United Kingdom. I chose to use France, Germany, 
and United Kingdom as comparisons to Spain’s data because these countries will give 
me a better picture of what issues have caused the problems in Spain. All of these 
countries have large economies that all are a big part of the total Eurozone economy. 
However, they each also have very distinct differences. Germany is the country that 
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Figure 8. Debt to GDP Ratio Eurozone Countries 2006-2013 
 
Source: Data taken from Eurostat 
one would think is the closest to the trend and is therefore a good comparison for 
Spain in terms of seeing what periods the country has had its largest problems. United 
Kingdom is a country that has its own monetary policy and has a much freer labor 
market than what Spain has, therefore we can expect United Kingdom and Spain to be 
quite different in many areas. France is expected to be similar to Spain in many areas, 
however as the data shows, this will indicate what areas that have caused Spain to 
suffer after the implementation of the euro. 
 
C. A Europe-Wide Solution – Monetary Policy 
   Charles Wyplosz, at the time he was president of the Bundesbank, portrayed 
the first decade of the Eurozone currency union as nine successful years followed by a 
destructive tenth year. Wyplosz argued that the success the currency union 
experienced during the first nine years was due to price stability and improved trade 
and financial integration. Although he thought that it was debatable whether this 
acceptable implementation was due to “good luck, good policies or both,” he 
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concluded that the Eurozone had “operated better than most observers had predicted” 
(Jimeno, 2000). One problem that especially the smaller peripheral countries have 
encountered is that the control that individual countries have over the common 
monetary policy for the Eurozone is very small. A more powerful economic country, 
like for example Germany, is more likely to dominate due to the fact that Germany 
had the best monetary policy to begin with so in many ways this country has more to 
say when implementing big decisions. This problem is often referred to as the 
competitiveness crisis where the imbalance between the different Eurozone countries 
is a possible source of conflict. In the future development of the currency union it will 
be important to equalize the power relationships between the member nations. 
After interviewing many people to get different point of views, Lars Jonung and Eoin 
Drea (2010) concluded in their research that the currency union in the Eurozone 
would encounter a lot of difficulties due to the fact that there is a significant 
difference between the needs of monetary policy between two countries such as 
Ireland and Italy, and with one single currency one cannot have that. Therefore, it will 
be hard to implement a common monetary policy that will solve the problems for 
each of the individual member countries in the Eurozone. Hence, this point illustrates 
that the common monetary policy imposed on all the member countries is the main 
issue that has led to some countries struggling more than others, as is the case for 
Spain.
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Chapter 3 
Spain 
A. Spain’s Experience in the Eurozone 
Spain has been progressing economically since the early 1960s. The Spanish 
Civil War ended in 1939 with the dictator Francisco Franco and the nationalists 
continuing to have the power in the country. The war was followed by a period of 
famine consistent of food shortages resulting in approximately 200,000 Spaniards 
dying. This period is therefore referred to as Los Años de Hambre, or the years of 
hunger. The nation’s rapid economic development after the civil war and the years of 
starvation has become known as the “Spanish miracle”. The determinant factor for 
Spain to achieve an increase in economic growth occurred in 1959 when Franco 
decided to rely less on the country’s various ideologies and give more authority to the 
Francoist technocrats. Most of these technocrats were members of the influential 
catholic group, the Opus Dei or the Work of God. This event resulted in that the 
Spanish government began to include more people that were working towards a 
modernized country. With this increase in authority that the technocrats had been 
given, they were able to move Spain towards a more modernized country. The 
technocrats introduced many new development strategies, such as convincing the rest 
of the country to adopt a free market economy, increasing competition, and having a 
closer relationship with other European countries. By increasing the cooperation with 
other countries, more international corporations decided to expand their businesses to 
Spain. These reforms resulted in an increase in growth. They also altered the 
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monetary policy of the country by closely following the guidelines of the 
International Monetary Fund. These new implementations resulted in the Spanish 
economic boom. At this time, Spain was suffering from overpopulation. Due to the 
change in economic policies, a lot of Spaniards moved to other countries and sent 
money back home to their families, which helped the economy recover. Another 
aspect that helped boosting the Spanish economy was the increased attention to 
introduce Spain as an attractive tourist destination. 
Spain became a member of the European Union in 1986 along with Portugal. 
Spain was among the first 11 countries to adopt the euro as their currency on 1st 
January 1999, and introduced notes and coins in 2002. Since its entry, the country’s 
economy has prospered in many areas, such as manufacturing, agriculture, mining, 
the services sector, and heavy industry (Marca España). Over the last couple of years 
Spain has had one of the fastest growing economies in the world. Looking at GDP, 
Spain is today the fifth largest economy in Europe, and represents 9% of the total 
economy in Europe. France, Germany and Italy are Spain’s most important trading 
partners. Half of Spain’s production comes from the autonomies located in the north 
of Spain: Catalonia and the Basque country. Catalonia has such a strong economy due 
to its diverse offering for tourists with both the nice Mediterranean beaches and the 
Pyrenees to enjoy. Also, this region has a strong manufacturing sector. The Basque 
country has the highest level of income per capita in Spain and the unemployment 
rate is much lower than in the rest of the country, approximately the same as the 
Eurozone average. This region has done well due to their strategic placement in the 
country and a strong industrial sector because of access to iron and minerals. 
Barcelona is the commercial center of Spain and is considered to be an important 
economic driver of the European economy. 
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   As mentioned above, the Spanish economy has had a lot of problems since the 
entry into the Eurozone. However, there are a lot of people that do not think that the 
decision for Spain to join the currency union in Europe was all bad. Luis Ángel Rojo, 
who was Governor of Banco de España when the Maastricht Treaty was signed, set 
Spain’s participation in EMU in a historical perspective. He described the challenges 
that Spain faced to join the monetary union as a founding member, and clearly 
identified the advantages of integration, on the basis that macroeconomic stability was 
a necessary condition for sustained economic growth. He indicated that, despite all 
the difficulties that had to be overcome during the transition to EMU, such as 
correcting large macroeconomic imbalances and imposing strong budgetary 
consolidation, he considered the efforts worthwhile (Jimeno, 2000). 
   However, as previously mentioned, Spain has encountered a lot of problems in 
recent years. The period from 2008 to the present has been described as the Spanish 
financial crisis due to many factors. The crisis was a reaction to long-term loans, the 
real estate crash, and a very high increase in unemployment. In February 2009, the 
downturn in Spain’s economy had gone so far that the nation, among other countries 
in Europe, entered into a recession. Although Spain has often been described as a 
European success story, the success proved to be unstable as this real estate bubble 
drove much of its growth. The article “An overview of Spain’s economy” describes: 
The real estate bubble was caused by a combination of low interest rates, 
financial deregulation, rising domestic incomes as well as strong demand from 
foreign investors, and overshadowed Spain's falling competitiveness. In 
addition, many of the new jobs created were restricted to low-wage, low-
productivity parts of the economy, such as construction and domestic services, 
while other more lucrative economic sectors remained sluggish. Eventually, 
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the burst of the housing bubble and the global financial crisis brought the 
Spanish economy into a severe downturn (Scios, 2012). 
The development of real estate prices in Spain saw its most crucial period between 
1996 and 2007 when prices rose by 200%. Therefore, one can conclude that after the 
burst of the housing bubble in 2007/2008, Spain’s economy has encountered severe 
challenges. 
The other problem that Spain has struggled with is their extremely high 
unemployment rate. The Department of Labor reported in January 2012 that the 
number of unemployed in Spain was 4.98 million, an increase of more than 132,000 
people from the month before. The rise in real estate prices combined with the 
subsequent crash and the extremely high unemployment rate have heavily impacted 
the livelihood of Spanish citizens. Since October 2008 the unemployment rate has 
continued to increase. By March 2012, Spain’s unemployment rate reached 24.4%, 
which is twice the Eurozone average. As Figure 9 below shows, since the financial 
crisis in 2008 Spain’s unemployment rate has diverged dramatically from most of the 
other Eurozone countries. In 2013, Spain’s unemployment rate was as high as 26.7%.  
Figure 9. Unemployment Rate Eurozone Countries 2001-2013 
 
Source: Data from Eurostat 
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In the Spanish labor market there are distinct groups of the labor force that are 
suffering more. For example, female and youth unemployment rates have been about 
10 to 20 percent higher than the aggregate unemployment. The most alarming feature 
of the Spanish labor market is that the unemployment rate for those Spaniards less 
than 25 years is around 50%. These young people are the most educated generation 
that the country has ever had, yet they face the highest rate of unemployment in 
Europe. The article in the Spanish newspaper El País “El paro juvenil sigue 
subiendo” describes that the unemployment rate for the Spanish population under 25 
years has increased to 53.28% (Romero, 2012), which means that more than half of 
the people under 25 years old that want to work in Spain, do not have the opportunity 
to do so. Figure 10 shows this development. 
 
Figure 10. European Youth Unemployment 1983-2013 
 
Source: Thompson (2013) 
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This problem has led to that a large amount of the highly educated Spaniards leave the 
country to search for better job opportunities. Recent numbers from OECD shows that 
the number of people leaving the country has taken over the number of arrivals, hence 
Spain is now a net emigrant country (La OCDE constata emigración neta por primera 
vez en España en 2011 de más de 50.000 personas por la crisis).  
   Another consequence is that highly educated people settle for jobs that pay 
minimum pay. This issue is often referred to as “over-qualification” and one can see 
that many people with college degrees have to settle for jobs that require no skills. A 
big concern among the Spanish population is that this generation will be known as the 
“Lost Generation” because of their constant search for jobs that will lead to that in the 
future they will be closed off from good careers. This problem also has another 
downside due to the fact that since there is not enough work, overeducated people end 
up having to take on lower paying jobs. When there is excess supply of labor, it is 
likely that highly educated workers who cannot find a job will accept jobs below their 
skill levels at the cost of “crowding out” lower educated workers who therefore 
become unemployed (Jimeno, Felgueroso, Dolado, 2000).  
   The fact that unemployment rates for lower (primary) educated and higher 
(tertiary/university) educated workers have quadrupled and tripled respectively over 
the last twenty years, and all despite a huge educational drive, can possibly be 
explained by a combination of three factors: (i) labor market institutional factors 
(fixed-term employment contracts, wage bargaining, etc.), (ii) skilled biased 
technological progress, and (iii) over-education and crowding-out of lower educated 
workers by higher educated ones who replace the former in their traditional entry jobs 
and engage into on-the-job search (Jimeno, Felgueroso, Dolado, 2000). 
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   Together with the high Spanish unemployment rate, other measures also show 
the worsening conditions in Spain. For example, the GDP per capita in Spain is also 
lower than these other comparison countries as Figure 11 shows and appears to be 
slightly diverging. 
 
Figure 11. GDP Per Capita Eurozone Countries 2008-2012 (in US$) 
 
Source: Data from Eurostat 
As well as the unemployment rate comparison above, the real GDP growth rate 
shown in Figure 12 on the next page shows the issues Spain is encountering in the 
near future. Figure 12 demonstrates the difficulties that Spain has had since the 
recovery phase after the economic crisis in 2008. Since 2010 one can clearly see that 
the growth rate of Spain has diverged from those of Germany, France, and United 
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Figure 12. Real GDP Growth Rate Eurozone Countries 2003-2013 
 
Source: Eurostat 
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combined with the reluctance to get rid off permanent workers are the two main 
problems for the country. To further explore this issue, I looked at a framework 
developed by Holt and Hendrickson (2014) which show that if costs associated with 
firing workers increase this results in a permanent higher unemployment rate.  
   Second, I calculated the labor wedge for four Eurozone countries. This 
measure is important because taxes cause inefficiencies in the economy. This 
tendency is due to the fact that workers do not get to keep all of their income because 
of the taxes they have to pay, which, given that the substitution effect is dominant, 
will result in workers having an incentive to work less and consume more leisure. 
However, my results showed that the labor wedge couldn’t explain why Spain has 
entered into a deeper recession than other Eurozone countries such as France, United 
Kingdom, and Germany because Spain actually had the lowest labor wedge of these 
countries. 
Third, I looked at the price level and how it has differed from country to 
country after the implementation of the euro. To do this, I compared the price level in 
different Eurozone countries relative to the counterfactual. In order to explain the 
effect of an event in economics it is useful to compare what actually happened to what 
would have happened if the event had not occurred. Therefore, it is helpful to use a 
counterfactual, which provides us with the trend of the measurement that is under 
investigation if it would have continued on the same path as it historically had been. 
In this thesis, the counterfactual was constructed by assuming that the price level 
would have remained on the same path that it had been for the past 20 years. This 
trend helped me be able to find the deviations from trend for Spain, France, Germany, 
and United Kingdom. What I found here was that all the countries are still below 
trend, however Spain is dramatically lower than any of the other nations. 
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i. OECD Regulations in Force on 1st January 2013 in Spain 
   In 2013, new regulations that affected the Spanish labor market were 
implemented. One distinct feature of the Spanish labor market is that the workers get 
a lot of compensation in severance pay “Workers dismissed for “objective” reasons: 
2/3 of a month’s pay per year of service up to a minimum of 12 months” (OECD page 
88). This aspect makes it costly to fire permanent workers in Spain and therefore one 
can see that there is a significant larger part of temporary contracts in this country 
compared to other European countries. Severance pay for people that have been 
dismissed unfairly is even longer, “The level for severance pay concerning unfair 
dismissal is calculated as 33 days pay per year of service with the upper limit of 24 
months pay” (OECD page 89) and for some contracts entered into prior to 12 
February 2012 the maximum severance pay amount can be up to 42 months pay. 
When employers have to pay their employees for such a long time period after firing 
them, it gives them an incentive not to fire their employees even if they are not being 
as efficient as would be optimal. 
   Another regulation that makes it costly for Spanish companies to fire 
employees is the length of the trial period for dismissal, which is very long in Spain. 
For example, a new type of employment contract was created in 2012, called the 
Permanent Employment Contract to Support Entrepreneurs. This contract is available 
exclusively to small and medium-sized enterprises with less than 50 employees that 
did not make unfair or collective dismissals in the 6 months preceding hiring. This 
contract sets the duration of trial period to 1 year, which is a long time. This implies 
that the business has to keep paying the employee for one year due to the lengthy 
process of getting a worker fired. This is good for workers because they are highly 
protected against losing their jobs, but it is also not efficient because it is hard for 
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companies to get rid of workers that they do not feel they need. When workers get a 
long time in notice before dismissal it means that they are taking up the spots for 
more qualified and efficient workers that could have increased productivity. Because 
of this trend of a longer time associated with firing a worker, it has resulted in that the 
Spanish companies are more critical when hiring new workers due to the increased 
cost of getting rid of employees that are doing a dissatisfactory job. On the other 
hand, this tendency could also lead to an increased competition for high salary paying 
jobs. If this were the case, it could increase the productivity of a country because it 
would give workers an incentive to push themselves harder to obtain these top 
positions. However, in Spain today it is apparent that the longer time associated with 
firing a worker has resulted in an increased scrutiny by employers when hiring new 
workers. 
   As discussed above, Spain has a large part of temporary contracts compared to 
other Eurozone countries. One of the features that also were discussed in these new 
regulations from the OECD is the long training contracts in the Spanish labor market, 
which can be looked at as a form of temporary contract that has a long time that it can 
be in effect: “Training contracts: may be extended for six months up to two years, or 
three years by collective agreement, and up to four years for workers with 
disabilities” (OECD page 89). There are also no restrictions on the number of 
renewals or prolongations of temporary work assignments: “No limitation for 
renewals of contracts between the agency and the worker” (OECD page 89). Also, the 
condition of becoming a permanent worker is very extensive:  
 Workers who – within a period of 30 months – had been hired during a period 
longer than 24 months, with or without continuity, for the same or different 
occupation within the same firm or group of companies and have been hired 
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directly either on two or more fixed-term contracts or being placed at disposal 
by temporary work agencies with the same or different type of fixed-term 
contract will acquire the condition of permanent workers (OECD page 90).  
The implications of this statement is that it is easy for a Spanish company to argue 
that an employee that has been a worker in the firm for several years is still under a 
temporary contract because of all these conditions that one have to fulfill in order to 
become a permanent worker. That means that, if the company enters an economic 
downturn, it will be easier for them to fire these employees because the employer can 
argue that they are still under temporary contracts. 
   As mentioned earlier, in Spain today it is extremely hard to get rid of 
permanent workers: “Replacement contract for workers near retirement: time left until 
the replaced worker reaches the age of 65, i.e. up to a maximum of 48 to 52 months, 
according to the age of the worker who retires” (OECD page 89). In Spain, it is 
currently hard for many corporations to fire employees that have been in the 
corporation for many years due to strong relationships. Here, it is assumed that the 
company would rehire and not eliminate the position to cut labor costs because of the 
many disadvantages associated with downsizing for a company. These disadvantages 
include lost business because of fewer available salespeople, a decrease in innovation 
because there are not enough people working on research and development, and 
reduced productivity due to the decreased work-morale associated with having 
workers laid off. Hence, the fact that these permanent workers are able to sit in their 
jobs for as long as they want has developed into a problem in the Spanish labor 
market because it forces younger and more qualified workers to settle for lower-paid 
jobs. 
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 ii. Current State of the Spanish Labor Market 
   The current state of the Spanish labor market is problematic. The Spanish 
labor market is highly dual, with about 30 percent of the labor force in temporary or 
fixed-term contracts. This is the highest level in the EU15 since the mid-1980s, and 
about double the EU15 average. Florence Jaumotte (2011) suggests that the key 
reform for lowering the unemployment rate in Spain is to reduce the share of 
temporary workers by lowering the high employment protection of permanent 
workers. This point is important in my analysis because it suggests that temporary 
employment will increase when the costs associated with hiring and firing permanent 
workers increase. This issue will result in a reluctance for employers to hire new 
workers and create more jobs. The reality for many Spanish workers today is that they 
are forced to take on temporary contracts, which comes with great uncertainties about 
the future. This job instability that many Spanish workers are facing today is an 
incredibly stressful reality to live in. By lowering the protection of permanent 
workers, it does not necessarily mean that it will result in firing these workers. It 
implies that more jobs in Spain can be qualified as permanent positions, due to the 
reduced conditions that a job has to fulfill in order to become a permanent position. 
This further implies that more jobs will be created and Spanish labors will face less 
instability in the job market. However, Jaumotte also argues that to reduce the 
unemployment rate, the decreased protection of permanent workers has to be 
combined with a decentralization of the collective bargaining in the workplace. The 
collective bargaining refers to the discussion between the employer and the employee 
to determine wage, hours worked, and other conditions for the workers. This will 
result in the Spanish labor market being more dynamic and responsive to labor market 
changes. Due to the fact that a higher share of part-time workers is positively 
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associated with lower unemployment then to try to raise the number of part-time 
workers could be something worth trying as well. This fact is because a part-time 
worker is not looked at as an unemployed worker, hence, having more people in part-
time positions will lower the unemployment rate for the country. 
   In their paper Bentolila, Cahuc, Dolado, and Barbanchon (2010) argue that the 
difference between the unemployment in Spain and France can be accounted for by 
the difference in employment protection legislation between the two countries. A 
response due to a combination of the larger gap between the dismissal costs of 
workers with permanent and temporary workers and the laxer rules on the use of 
temporary contracts in Spain than in France. The idea is further developed by 
Blanchard and Jimeno (1995) who argue that Portugal and Spain have had remarkable 
similar histories over the last 20 years, however Portugal has the lowest 
unemployment rate of 6.8% and Spain has the highest on of 24.4% in the Eurozone. 
This paper argues that the different combinations of unemployment protection and 
unemployment benefits can explain the magnitude of the difference in the 
unemployment between the two countries. 
   Research has been conducted on how a country’s employment protection 
legislation can affect its unemployment rate. One framework, developed by Holt and 
Hendrickson (2014) describes this issue by identifying that if costs for employers to 
fire their employees increase, it will result in employers not being willing to alter their 
production and be very careful before hiring new employees. Increased firing costs 
can come from different administrative costs associated with firing people, such as, 
for example, severance packages and having a long time notice before dismissal. In 
this framework, it is demonstrated that an increase in the costs associated with firing a 
worker will result in a permanent higher unemployment rate. Hence, this framework 
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argues that although the primary goal of the Employment Protection Legislation 
(EPL) policies is to reduce the incidence of unemployment, it can actually have the 
opposite effect.  
   The Harlan and Hendrickson (2014) framework includes two graphs, shown in 
Figure 13 on the next page. The first graph includes the wage curve and the job 
creation curve. Real wage is on the vertical axis and labor market tightness is on the 
horizontal axis. The wage curve has a positive slope because as vacancy increases, 
employers need more workers, resulting in the employees to be in a position to 
negotiate higher wages. The job creation curve is downward sloping because it 
demonstrates that the firm is willing to create more jobs when the wage is lower. The 
graph on the right hand side, displays the vacancy rate on the vertical axis and the 
unemployment rate on the horizontal axis. The Beveridge Curve shows the possible 
combinations of unemployment rates and vacancy rates in equilibrium. The tightness 
curve is a straight line from the origin that has a slope equal to the labor market 
tightness parameter. The intersection between these two curves determines the 
equilibrium vacancy rate and unemployment rate, as Figure 13 shows. 
   As described above, this framework shows that the effect of a stricter 
Employment Protection Legislation will shift the wage curve up since workers are in 
a position to negotiate for a higher wage at any level of labor market tightness. Due to 
the better protection of the workers, the associated wages for all workers will increase 
because the employer takes this into account when hiring new employees. This results 
in a downward shift in the job creation curve because it increases the costs of both 
hiring and firing a worker and therefore the firm is willing to pay less to the worker 
than they were previously. As one can see from Figure 14 on the next page, the  
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Figure 13. Employment Protection Legislation Framework 1 
 
Source: Holt and Hendrickson (2014) 
 
Figure 14. Employment Protection Legislation Framework 2 
 
Source: Holt and Hendrickson (2014) 
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intersection between the wage curve and the job creation curve, which determines the 
equilibrium real wage and labor tightness, will result in decrease in the labor market 
tightness parameter. The effect on the real wage is ambiguous because it depends on 
how much each curve shifts. This transfers over to the graph on the right hand side 
with having the tightness curve rotate down as an effect of what happened in the 
previous graph. As Figure 14 on the previous page shows, this results in a decrease in 
the vacancy rate, and a permanent increase in the unemployment rate. 
   This framework implies that due to the higher cost associated with each 
employee the vacancy will fall. This will result in a permanent increase in 
unemployment rate due to these EPL policies. Hence, this framework can explain that 
part of the extremely high unemployment rate in Spain is a result of the country’s 
strict employment protection legislation. 
   To further display the significant difference between the share of temporary 
employment compared to the total unemployment rate, I looked at the differences 
between Spain, France, Germany, and United Kingdom on this matter. I have put the 
results together in Figure 15 on the next page. 
   Figure 15 displays the problem earlier discussed with Spanish labor markets. 
As the graphs show, it seems like that in countries as for example Spain, France, and 
Germany, where there is significant labor market regulation, one can observe a strong 
relationship between unemployment and temporary employment. Whereas one do not 
observe the same tendency with respect to the United Kingdom, which is a country 
with a much freer labor market. One can also see from the graph that the share of 
temporary employment in Spain is higher than in any of the other countries. 
I also looked at other indicators that can potentially explain some of Spain’s 
problems. First, I found the average ratio of the strictness of regulations on permanent 
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Figure 15. Share of Temporary Employment Compared to the Total 
Unemployment Rate Eurozone Countries 2001-2011 
 
Source: Data from the OECD Database  
 
employment relative to the same measure for temporary employment. As shown 
below, this will give us some more indicators of how the Spanish labor market has 
done since the euro was implemented relative to other Eurozone countries. This is 
shown in Table 2 and Figure 16. 
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Table 2. Average Strictness of Regulations on Permanent Employment 
Compared to Average Strictness of Regulations on Temporary Employment 
Eurozone Countries  
  ASRPE ASRTE 
Spain 2,747 3,321 
France 2,392 3,509 
United Kingdom 1,106 0,297 
Germany 2,715 2,228 
Source: Data from Eurostat (ASRPE: Average strictness of regulations on permanent 
employment, ASRTE: Average strictness of regulations on temporary employment) 
 
 
Figure 16. Average Strictness of Regulations on Permanent Employment 
Compared to Average Strictness of Regulations on Temporary Employment 
Eurozone Countries 
 
Source: Data from Eurostat 
On the following page, I have calculated the average ratio of the strictness of 
regulations on permanent employment relative to the same measure for temporary 
employment, shown in Figure 17. 
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Table 4. Average Strictness of Regulations on Permanent Employment Divided 
by Average Strictness of Regulations on Temporary Employment Eurozone 
Countries 
  ASRPE/ASRTE 
Spain 0,827169467 
France 0,68177887 
United Kingdom 3,720267246 
Germany 1,218200186 
Source: Data from Eurostat 
 
Figure 17. Average Strictness of Regulations on Permanent Employment Divided 
by Average Strictness of Regulations on Temporary Employment Eurozone 
Countries 
 
Source: Data from Eurostat 
If I had found here that this measure was much larger for Germany than Spain and 
France, this would have given some indication of structural problems. However, what 
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response to a bigger shock. This gives credence to the idea that this is a EU problem 
rather than simply a Spanish problem. 
iii. Calculation of the Labor Wedge 
   To go further into the analysis of the Spanish labor market it is interesting to 
look at the labor wedge. In his work, Loukas Karabarbounis (2013) defined the labor 
wedge as the gap between the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and 
consumption and the marginal product of labor caused by taxes. In equilibrium, the 
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure equals the marginal 
product of labor. However, taxes generate a wedge between these values that causes 
inefficiencies in the economy. The inefficiencies occur since the marginal product of 
labor is no longer equal to the marginal rate of substitution.  
   If taxes in an economy increase, it results in a decrease in the real wage. The 
effect for the workers is that it reduces the cost of leisure and the benefit of working 
many hours declines. However, the effect that taxes have on a country’s economy 
depends on whether the substitution effect or the income effect is dominant in the 
nation. The substitution effect implies that there is a negative relationship between the 
real wage and leisure. Hence, if the real wage decreases, a worker is going to have an 
incentive to substitute labor for leisure. Therefore, if the substitution effect is the 
dominant effect in a country’s economy, an increase in taxes will result in a decrease 
in hours worked. The income effect suggests that when a country experiences an 
increase in taxes, and hence a lower wage, workers will decrease their consumption of 
goods and leisure will go down. Therefore, if the income effect is the dominant effect 
in the country’s economy, an increase in taxes will lead to an increase in hours 
worked. In his research, Edward C. Prescott (2004) found that compared to 
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Americans, Europeans work less hours. He found that the reason was due to the tax 
rate and these effects previously described. In his research, Prescott compared actual 
hours worked to the predicted amount of hours worked in the periods 1970-1974 and 
1993-1996 for different countries. The results showed that between these two periods, 
the European countries had a much larger decline in hours worked than what the U.S. 
showed. Prescott concluded in his research that the European countries had 
experienced higher tax rates. Also, this made it possible to determine that the 
substitution effect was dominant in the European countries because the increase in 
taxes resulted in a decrease in hours worked (Prescott, 2004). 
   Therefore, one can assume that if the substitution effect is dominant in the 
Eurozone countries, an increase in taxes will give the workers an incentive to prefer 
more leisure and therefore the result is fewer hours worked. This demonstrates how I 
calculated the labor wedge for each of the countries.  
   First, I looked at this from the household’s perspective. Suppose households 
have a utility function 
 
 where C is consumption and h is hours worked. The household’s utility is therefore 
increasing in consumption and leisure. The household maximizes utility subject to a 
budget constraint:  
 
where wt is the real wage and τ is the tax on labor. 
The first order condition for this problem yields an equilibrium condition: 
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This equilibrium condition states that the marginal rate of substitution is equal to the 
after-tax wage earned by the worker. The marginal rate of substitution is the slope of 
the indifference curve (in absolute value). The after-tax real wage is the slope of the 
budget line (in absolute value). Graphically, we always show that the slope of the 
indifference curve is equal to the slope of the budget line. This equilibrium condition 
is the mathematical analog to the graph. Put differently, the left-hand side is capturing 
the marginal benefit of leisure whereas the right-hand side of the equation is 
measuring the marginal cost of leisure. Thus, in equilibrium, the marginal benefit 
from leisure must be equal to the marginal cost of leisure. Otherwise, we aren’t 
maximizing utility. Finally, we can think of this equilibrium condition as the labor 
supply curve. 
Now we can look at this from the firm’s perspective. The firm wants to maximize 
profit, 
 
where z is some measure of productivity and α is the labor share of aggregate income. 
Solving the profit-maximization problem yields: 
 
Thus, the marginal product of labor is equal to the wage. Given the properties of the 
production function, we could write this as  
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equilibrium in the labor market: 
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Written in this form, the left-hand side represents the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and leisure. The right-hand side represents the marginal product of labor. Since an equilibrium must be
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or
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Taxes enerate a wedge between these values. (To understand the concept of a labor wedge, think
back to principles of microeconomics and the cost of taxation. Taxes generate a wedge between the price
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Thus, it is no longer the case that the marginal product of labor is equal to the marginal rate of
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However, if we generalize equation (1), we can think of ⌧ as not simply the tax rate, but as simply
anything that might drive a wedge between the MRS and the MPL. THIS is what we mean by the labor
wedge. The size of the labor wedge might therefore depend on factors other than tax rates. It might, for
example, depend on the degree of regulation in the labor market. As a result, we would like to estimate
the labor wedge for each country by using our equilibrium condition. Re-arranging our equilibrium
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We can then calculate ⌧ by making the following assumptions about the parameters:
✓ = 0.7
1  ↵ = .67
In addition, since we have normalized the amount of time that a worker can devote to work and leisure
to sum to unity, we can normalize hours worked by making the total amount of time available equal to
the total number of potential hours. For example, let’s assume that workers can work 5 days per week
and that they must get 8 hours of sleep per day. Thus, the total number of hours that someone could
work in a year is 5 ⇤ 16 ⇤ 52 = 4, 160. Thus, to calculate h take the total number of hours worked per
person per year and divide this number by 4,160. One can then use this normalized measure of hours,
the parameter values above, and the consumption-to-GDP ratio to calculate ⌧ .
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However, if we generalize the equation above, we can think of τ as not simply the tax 
rate, but as simply anything that might drive a wedge between the MRS and the MPL. 
This is what we mean by the labor wedge. The size of the labor wedge might 
therefore depend on factors other than tax rates. It might, for example, depend on the 
degree of regulation in the labor market. As a result, we would like to estimate the 
labor wedge for each country by using our equilibrium condition. Re-arranging our 
equilibrium condition above, we have: 
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iv. Calculations of the Labor Wedge for Spain, Germany, France, and United 
Kingdom 
Table 2 below demonstrates the values of the Labor Wedge calculated for 
Germany, France, Spain, and United Kingdom. 
Table 2. Labor Wedge Calculated for Eurozone Countries 2002-2012 
  
Labor Wedge = 1 - (1/LaborShare)*(c/y)*[h/(1-h)] 
Germany France Spain  United Kingdom 
2002 0.661 0.657 0.521 0.546 
2003 0.659 0.655 0.533 0.555 
2004 0.661 0.647 0.536 0.557 
2005 0.660 0.647 0.545 0.557 
2006 0.668 0.656 0.553 0.565 
2007 0.680 0.653 0.559 0.563 
2008 0.678 0.649 0.559 0.571 
2009 0.677 0.648 0.561 0.568 
2010 0.676 0.646 0.548 0.567 
2011 0.677 0.648 0.534 0.577 
2012 0.679 0.649   0.557 
Average 0.670 0.651 0.545 0.562 
 Source: Data from Eurostat 
These measures for the labor wedges in the different countries indicate that the 
differences in unemployment do not seem to be explained by the labor wedge. Thus, 
while employment protection might help explain the differences in unemployment, 
the labor wedge does not. This is because the average value for Spain is actually the 
lowest of all the values calculated. This implies that the labor wedge is not what has 
caused the deeper recession that Spain has experienced compared to France, United 
Kingdom, and Germany. In the next section I will look at another indicator of whether 
it is the membership in the Eurozone that is the main cause of the problems in Spain 
and therefore a suboptimal policy or if it is more evidence for country-specific issues. 
	   58 
v. Price Level Trend for Spain, Germany, France, and United Kingdom 
   Another data set that I looked at is the trend in the price levels for Spain, 
France, Germany, and United Kingdom. The price level is something that the central 
bank can control, therefore by looking at the tendency of inflation over the period 
after the implementation of the euro in these countries I can find some indication of 
the effect of the European Central Bank policy on its member countries. First, I used 
the price level for each country by taking data on each country’s Consumer Price 
Index and found inflation by taking the percentage difference between each year. 
Then I looked at the period between 2002 and 2012 to see how much the price level 
changed from year to year over this period compared to a trend that shows what 
would have happened using the 20 year average rate of inflation. The counterfactual 
was constructed by normalizing the initial Consumer Price Index from 2002 to one. 
Then the trend was found by assuming that the price level would grow at the 20-year 
average rate of inflation. Since the actual price level was normalized to 1, the initial 
observation for the trend and the actual series are equal. This comparison of the actual 
price level and the trend of what would have happened give us an indication of what 
actually happened and what one would have predicted could have happened if there 
had been no crisis. Then the deviation from trend was found, and this shows us the 
percentage deviation of the price level from trend. The deviation from trend is shown 
in Figure 18. This graph shows that the trend in the inflation rate for all the countries 
fell below the trend during the financial crisis. However, it is evident that Germany, 
France, and United Kingdom have gotten back closer to trend than what Spain has. 
Figure 17 demonstrates that all of these countries are still below the counterfactual, 
however the deviation is much larger for Spain than for the other countries. This 
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illustrates that monetary policy has been tighter in Spain than in these other Eurozone 
countries. 
Figure 18. Deviations of the Price Level From Trend Eurozone countries 2003-
2012 
 
Source: Data taken from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
vi. Concluding Remarks of the Spanish Labor Market Analysis 
   By looking at these different measures, I have found different effects that are 
able to give important insights into the causes of Spain’s economic problems since the 
implementation of the euro in 2001. The extremely high unemployment rate that the 
country has been struggling with, especially after the financial crisis of 2008, can in 
some degree be explained by their employment protection legislation. Due to the high 
cost of firing Spanish workers and the large amount of temporary contracts, 
employers are reluctant to hire new people. Hence, this employment protection 
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legislation has the effect of permanently increasing the unemployment rate. Other 
factors that were discussed that also have affected the country’s high unemployment 
rate are the severe consequences that the burst of the housing bubble in Spain had for 
the economy combined with the drop in tourism due to the international financial 
crisis. 
   The labor wedge demonstrates the wedge that taxes and the degree of 
regulation in the labor market generate between the marginal rate of substitution of 
consumption and leisure and the marginal product of labor. My calculations showed 
that the labor wedge was the lowest for Spain, and hence I can conclude that this is 
not the right measure to look at in order to explain the country’s economic difficulties. 
However, by looking at a measure that the European Central Bank can directly 
control, such as the price level, I was able to find some indication of the effect of ECB 
policy on its member countries. The comparison of the counterfactual (what would 
have happened if the trend from the 20 previous years continued) and what actually 
happened to the price level in the different countries showed that all of these four 
Eurozone countries have been below the counterfactual. However, one can clearly see 
that Spain’s price level has diverged more from the counterfactual than any of the 
other nations have. 
 These results give credence to the idea that the issues that Spain has 
encountered are a result of the mixture of both country-specific issues, such as the 
strong employment protection legislation and the high portion of temporary contracts, 
and the Eurozone monetary policy that was imposed on them after they entered the 
currency union.
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Conclusions 
    The implementation of a common currency in 2002 is the best example of 
economic integration between European countries. The early years of the currency 
union were marked by economic progress of each of the member nations. However, 
this apparent success in the first years of the currency union where it looked like the 
member countries’ economies were converging was not true. The countries were 
actually diverging. The financial crisis in 2008 affected certain countries in the 
Eurozone more than others. In the years following this downturn in the economy, one 
can see how some of the Eurozone countries have been struggling a lot economically.  
   In this thesis, I have looked at Spain because I wanted to find the reasons for 
the deeper recession that this country has experienced compared to other big countries 
in the Eurozone. Also, by comparing Spain to other countries, I wanted to figure out 
whether the economic issues experienced in the Eurozone are due to the common 
monetary policy or more due to country-specific problems. What is evident from my 
research is that there are combinations of factors that have created complications for 
Spain. 
   One significant issue in Spain is their unemployment rate. Spain is one of the 
countries with the highest and fastest growing unemployment rates in the Eurozone. 
This is an alarming trend. Currently Spain has an unemployment rate of over 26% and 
for Spaniards less than 25 years old it is above 50%. Looking at data of 
unemployment rates between the different Eurozone countries, it is clear that Spain 
has diverged from the other countries since 2008. From the data that I have looked at, 
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it is apparent that Spain has experienced difficulties since the recovery phase after the 
economic crisis in 2008. Since then, one can clearly see that both the unemployment 
rate and the growth rate in real GDP for Spain has diverged from those of Germany, 
France, and United Kingdom. Also, compared to these countries, the trend in Spain’s 
debt to GDP ratio has been increasing a lot more over the past few years. 
   The issue that I have researched is whether these problems that Spain have 
encountered are due to their membership in the currency union and therefore 
suboptimal monetary policy or if it is more due to issues and policies that is 
happening domestically. To explore this further I looked at the Spanish labor market. 
Some of the measures that I looked at gave credibility to the idea that this is a 
Eurozone problem rather than each individual country. This idea was found in the 
calculations displayed of the labor wedge. The labor wedge calculation showed that it 
was not so much the structural problems in Spain that were the main issue because it 
was higher for Germany and France, and lower for Spain and United Kingdom. I also 
looked at the ratio of the strictness of regulations on permanent employment relative 
to the same measurement for temporary employment and this supported the same 
idea. In order for this measurement to have provided us with some indication of that 
this might be more of a structural problem in Spain, the values should have been 
higher for Germany than for Spain and France. However, the values were similar and 
this provides more credibility to the idea that it is the common monetary policy that is 
the issue for the member nations of the currency union.  
   However, some of the other measurements that I looked at showed results that 
are supporting the idea of country-specific problems in individual countries in the 
Eurozone. Spain has strict employment protection legislation. In the framework that I 
discussed, it was shown that higher employment protection leads to a permanently 
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higher unemployment rate. Also, I looked at the share of temporary employment and 
the unemployment rate. Here I found a strong relationship between these two 
measurements. This is especially a problem in Spain because large shares of the 
Spanish workers are hired on temporary contracts. I also looked at the deviations from 
trend of the inflation rates of the Eurozone countries over the period 2002-2012. The 
result found was that Spain had deviated from trend a lot more than the other 
countries. This indicates that Spain has had a tighter monetary policy than other 
member countries in the currency union and supports the idea of domestic problems 
in Spain. 
   Therefore, as Spain and the Eurozone implements methods to resolve some of 
the problems that they are currently facing, it is important to consider this issue as 
being a mix of two complications. First, it was a bold move to impose a single 
currency on a very heterogeneous group of countries. It is evident that a good 
monetary policy for a country such as for example Germany might not be the best 
option for a country like Spain. Hence, the common monetary policy for all the 
members of the currency union is one of the problems. Second, there are indicators of 
country-specific issues that also have developed into problems for some of the 
countries in the Eurozone. For Spain this is their employment protection policy, 
which has resulted in their extremely high unemployment rate. 
   The main issues that should be addressed in Spain are their employment 
protection legislation and how they can make this policy more flexible. Another issue 
to be looked into in Spain is how they are implementing their monetary policy, since 
there is found evidence that they have had a tighter monetary policy. Also, one should 
try to pay more attention to the development of the Eurozone’s monetary policy so 
that all member countries will benefit as much as possible from new changes. If more 
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changes like these can be made, Spain can possibly recover from their recession and 
the Eurozone will become a stronger currency union. 
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